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considerations play a large role in the theism-naturalism debate will have 
to consist of a sizable number of passages quoted from participants in that 
debate. On the other hand, the extended argument, to the effect that the-
ism has more explanatory power than naturalism, could well have been 
presented more in their own voice and less in the voice of others.
Divine Evil? The Moral Character of the God of Abraham, edited by Michael 
Bergmann, Michael J. Murray, and Michael C. Rea. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2010. 337 pages. $125.00 (hardcover).
PAUL COPAN, Palm Beach Atlantic University
In 2009, the University of Notre Dame hosted the “My Ways Are Not Your 
Ways” conference. On the table was the topic of the moral character of 
“the God of Abraham” as found in the Hebrew scriptures. The able philos-
ophers and co-editors of this volume—Bergmann, Murray, and Rea—have 
put together an important collection of essays on a subject getting increas-
ing attention, due in some measure to the criticisms of the New Atheistic 
foursome (Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris, Dennett). In this volume, protago-
nists and antagonists directly address issues all-too-frequently evaded 
by Bible readers—the nature of the God of the Hebrews, who apparently 
“commends bigotry, misogyny, and homophobia, condones slavery, and 
demands the adoption of unjust laws” (1).
Contributors friendly to the Hebrew God include Eleonore Stump, 
Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Peter van 
Inwagen, Mark Murphy, and John Hare. Those on the not-too-pleased-
with-God side include Louise Antony, Edwin Curley, Evan Fales, Wes 
Morriston, and Paul Draper.
The book is divided into four parts: (I) Philosophical Perspectives: 
Problems Presented; (II) Philosophical Perspectives: Solutions Proposed; 
(III) Theological Perspectives; (IV) Concluding Remarks. What adds inter-
est and depth to the book is the structure of each chapter (save the last), in 
which the presentation is followed by an opponent’s comments, to which 
the original presenter replies to round things out.
In the introduction, the editors analyze the various options on moral 
difficulties in the Hebrew scriptures with, for instance, the category of 
herem (“the ban/devotion to destruction”): (a) deny the texts are divinely 
inspired; (b) deny God’s goodness; (c) declare the biblical text a mystery 
on these matters; or (d) “(try to) revise one’s own moral values, intuitions, 
or whatever in light of the text” (12).
Now, the book is not as wide-ranging as many of us would have wanted 
it to be, and this is understandable given space limitations. Indeed, the God-
critics such as Louise Antony, Edwin Curley, and Evan Fales in particular 
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raise more snakes than the God-defenders attempt to kill. In my estimation, 
more chapters on the Hebrew texts on servitude in Israel, harsh laws, and 
treatment of women could have helped round out the discussion. The topic 
receiving the most attention from both sides is Israel’s warfare against the 
Canaanites (Joshua and Judges)—and the Amalekites (1 Samuel 15) and 
even the Midianites (Numbers 31). The contributors not only offer some 
fruitful (not to mention critical) moral and theological reflections, but even 
hermeneutical and textual ones as well. John Hare’s chapter on “Animal 
Sacrifices” is well-written and, to my mind, persuasive, but something of a 
deviation from the book’s common core.
I refer the book’s readers to the “Chapter Abstracts” (22–26) for a con-
cise overview of its contents. Below, I shall simply note some of the contri-
butions on both sides of the debate to give the reader a feel for the book.
On the negative side, we see comments like Edwin Curley’s, who chal-
lenges the attempt to find good motives for killing Canaanites. Some may 
attempt to rephrase “God so loved the Canaanites that he ordered the 
Israelites to utterly destroy them” by resorting to the academically polite 
jargon of decent obscurity: “It’s epistemically possible that God ordered 
the Israelites to destroy the Canaanites out of love for the Canaanites” 
(71–71). Curley dismisses these as desperate measures.
Evan Fales’s “Satanic Verses” chapter is a hard-hitting one, which in-
cludes a “catalogue of ‘horrors’” approved or permitted by Yahweh. For 
good measure, he throws in the New Testament, which goes beyond the 
Hebrew Bible’s vagueness about postmortem existence by offering a more 
developed understanding—including the doctrine of hell, which Fales 
finds morally repugnant.
Louise Antony uses the children’s story of Heckedy Peg to illustrate a dis-
analogy: on the one hand, we have a loving, valiant mother who rescues 
her disobedient children who have fallen into the hands of the trickster 
Heckedy Peg, and, on the other, God’s treatment of Adam and Eve after 
they’ve succumbed to the paradisal tempter: “Heckedy Peg celebrates the 
valor of maternal love; Genesis exhibits the power of a tyrant” (30). Again: 
“In attitudes, motives, methods, and reactions, God is the antithesis of a 
good parent” (ibid.). Antony throws in criticisms of God’s (mis)treatment 
of Job and of Moses to reinforce her point.
On the positive side, Richard Swinburne follows Augustine’s dictum 
of interpreting particular passages as metaphorical when they clearly 
conflict with purity of life or sound doctrine—such as the Canaanite pas-
sages. By contrast, Plantinga, Murphy, and Stump tackle the worst-case 
herem scenario—that God was justified even if he commanded the killing 
of Canaanites/Amalekites. Plantinga states that God is the Giver (and thus 
rightful Taker) of life; that death is not the worst thing; that the Canaan-
ites’ sin was far more wicked than our dulled modern moral intuitions 
recognize; and that the Incarnation and Atonement reveal the love of God 
and that “whatever God did, he must indeed have a good reason, even if 
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we can’t see what the reason is” (113). Murphy argues that God did not 
act wrongly with respect to the Jerichoites since God did not wrong them; 
God and humans do not participate in the same “dikaiological order.” 
Murphy states that, analogously, parents do or demand things that are 
not always understood by their children—things that may appear severe 
or arbitrary (167).
Peter van Inwagen comments that the Hebrew Bible sought to address 
the twistedness of the Jews to help them see more clearly how corrupted 
they were—not to create perfect people—and that Judeo-Christian-inspired 
morality brought about a dramatic change in the Mediterranean world in 
the face of Roman brutality: “The morality of almost everyone in Western 
Europe and the Anglophone countries today (if that person is not a criminal 
or a sociopath)” is basically a variation on Judeo-Christian morality (81).
Wolterstorff’s chapter (“Reading Joshua”), along with his reply to Gary 
Anderson, includes a careful literary analysis of the Hebrew Bible’s war 
texts. Acknowledging the harsh language such as “leave alive nothing 
that breathes,” the text simultaneously mentions large numbers of surviv-
ing Canaanites who cannot even be driven out by Israel. Critics emphasize 
the “literal” killing of Canaanites while ignoring their “literal” survival 
and ongoing coexistence with Israel. War texts stating “no survivor was 
left” should be understood hyperbolically, not literally: “These texts are 
highly stylized, metaphorical, hyperbolic” (287).
Stump’s response to Paul Draper on the topic of the Amalekites is partic-
ularly insightful. She offers a thought experiment of “an intelligent being 
Max from a far-distant world” in which all sentient beings never get seri-
ously sick and none ever dies. Max is enabled to view a video of “events 
inside a large city hospital on earth where the Chief of Staff is a surgeon.” 
Upon seeing the video, “Max is filled with moral indignation at the doctors, 
who plunge sharp objects into human beings first to render them helpless 
and then to slice them open with sharp knives” (204). The patients appear 
to leave the hospital in far worse shape than when they came in. Stump 
concludes: “Genocide, like torture, is not properly defined without refer-
ence to some intention or motivation. Where the primary aim is healing, 
rescue from death, there is neither torture nor genocide. And just as it is 
possible to recognize what looks like torture as instead done in the interest 
of healing, however counter-intuitive such a recognition may seem to Max, 
it is also possible to recognize God’s ending of the existence of civilizations, 
nations, and peoples as motivated by providential care” (207).
The book is as engaging as a scholarly book can get—from the chapters’ 
formatting to the range of participants in this debate. The book’s editors 
are to be commended for specifically encouraging interdisciplinary en-
gagement beyond this book. They mention four areas for further research: 
ancient Near Eastern literary styles; ancient Near Eastern cultures; the rel-
evance of interpretive traditions; and theories about biblical inspiration, 
divine revelation, and the authority of scripture and tradition (13–19).
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We can be grateful for such a book that tackles these difficult issues 
head-on and for its encouragement to probe these matters more thor-
oughly in the context of interdisciplinary dialogue.
Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument, by J. P. Moreland. 
New York, 2008. 244 pages. $133 (hardcover).
ULRICH SCHMIDT, Academy for Philosophy, Munich
In his book Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument, J. P. 
Moreland argues that the existence of conscious beings in the universe 
is evidence for the existence of God. In the first chapter, Moreland ad-
dresses naturalism, the main rival world-view opposed to theism. Strong 
naturalism is the view that all particulars, all properties, all relations, and 
all laws in the universe are physical. And there are no entities like mental 
properties, souls, angels or God inside or outside of the universe. The 
spatio-temporal universe (or universes) postulated by current science is 
all there is (8–9). By contrast, weak naturalism softens the definition of 
strong naturalism and accepts forms of emergent mental properties (ix, 
8–9). Naturalism is committed to telling a “Grand Story,” a causal story 
of how all things there are now in the universe came to be. This story 
will include the Big Bang, the development of organic matter out of inor-
ganic structures, the evolution of complex organisms and the emergence 
of consciousness (6–8). The ontology of a naturalist will be a physicalist 
ontology, and existence will be defined as belonging to the causal space-
time system of our universe (8–10). If we accept naturalism, then we must 
either reduce consciousness to physical states (reductive physicalism) 
or deny that consciousness exists (eliminative physicalism). Naturalism 
faces the location problem: Naturalists allow only physical entities to 
exist. So they have the problem of what to do with entities like semantic 
content, mind, consciousness, qualia, and agency. Where should they be 
located? The naturalist faces the tough task of locating them somewhere 
in the mereological hierarchy which naturalists usually accept.
In naturalism, the ground level of the hierarchy consists of elementary 
particles. At higher levels there are sub-atomic parts, atoms, molecules, 
cells and living organisms. These entities are constituted by the elementary 
particles. Their properties and their behavior can be entirely explained in 
terms of the properties and behavior of the elementary particles. They 
can be reduced to the elementary particles. The relation between indi-
viduals at level n and individuals at level n + 1 is the part-whole-relation. 
Cells are parts of living organisms. Molecules are parts of cells. Atoms 
are parts of molecules. Sub-atomic parts like protons and neutrons are 
parts of atoms. Elementary particles like up-quarks and down-quarks are 
parts of sub-atomic parts (10–15). An emergent property is a unique new 
